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A stra t 
It is soon to be 100 years since the modern Transcaprathian region of Ukraine (also known 
as Kárpátal a, as the Podkarpatska Rus and as the Zakarpattia Region) was incorporated 
into the new-born state of Czechoslovakia as per the treaty of Saint-Germain-en- aye. 
Czechoslovakia was built by merging different ethnicities, one of which were the Rusyns 
who were promised substantial autonomy within the confines of their traditional ethnic 
lands. The present study examines the thoughts of the Rusyn leaders regarding their 
preferences of territorial belonging at the end of World War I, with due attention to the 
differences between various groups in Hungary and in the American diaspora. At the Paris 
Peace Conference, the Rusyns, as members of the Czechoslovak delegation, were aiming 
to gain fair borders for their nation, a task that was, however, complicated, to say the least. 
During the conference, the region became a source of numerous conflicts between the 
victors, and even within the Czechoslovak delegation itself. As a result, significant Rusyn 
minorities remained in Romania, Poland and Slovakia. In this particular case, geopolitical 
considerations prevailed over the principle of self-determination for a nation which the 
“New Europe” declared to be one of the key elements of the postwar world. The fact that 
the seceding parts of imperial states were often divided about what country to belong to 
and under which particular political elite is often overlooked in Western historiography. 
This study seeks to provide new insights into this relatively seldom-discussed case   and 
into the reasons and circumstances that led to the decisions taken at the Conference in 
regard to it. 
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 o ar s t e   ranton  esolution 
After four years of war, in January 1919 in Paris, the Peace Conference started to work 
in order to shape the post-war world. One of the treaties of the Paris Peace conference 
was the one signed in Saint-Germain-en- aye on September 10, 1919. As per the treaty, 
the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy dissolved and numerous independent states appeared 
on the map of Europe based on the right of the self-determination of nations. One of these 
new states was the Czechoslovak republic, which obtained for itself a territory that 
appeared in its diplomatic doctrine at the very end of the war – a terra in ognita that 
previously had no geopolitical importance in Europe, yet became a source of conflicts 
between the victors: today’s Transcarpathia. 
The region we now refer to as the Transcarpathian region (of Ukraine), or as 
Subcarpathia  (Kárpátal a), or as Podkarpatska Rus (as it was named in Czechoslovakia), 
was not known as a clearly defined territorial unit at the time. It was formed from certain 
parts of the four counties in the Northeast of Hungary, namely, Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa and 
Máramaros, and was inhabited by a mixed population of Rusyns, Hungarians, 
Romanians, Slovaks, Jews, etc. The fact of the presence of several ethnic groups in the 
region turned it – the entire territory or certain parts of it – into an ob ect of clashing 
aspirations for the waring nations. 
The Russian Empire, for its part, declared at the beginning of the war that it intended 
to incorporate Galicia and Northern Hungary (the Hungarian Rus as they called it) into 
its own territory. They built their demand on the fact that Tsarist Russia considered the 
local population as Russians. The claim to legitimacy was based on the asserted need to 
unite the Slavic population in the same Empire. 
Certain parts of the Northeastern counties fell into the sphere of interest of Romania. 
In the 19th century, almost one half of ethnic Romanians lived outside of Romania. With 
this fact in mind, Russia planned to gain support from Romania by offering it the region 
of Bukovina up to the river Prut, and Máramaros county to the south of the river Tisza. 
 
  In English, Subcarpathia (Ukrainian Subcarpathia) is the most common contemporary term that refers to 
the Prykarpatia region on the northeastern side of the Carpathians in Ukraine. In this article, we use this 
term to denote the southern side of Carpathians. 
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Territorial offers were later also noted in the agreement signed by Romania and Russia in 
mid-summer 191 . One of the obligations for Romania stemming from this was that it 
would have to  oin the war by August 2 , 191  at the latest (Spector, 19 2: 2 - 2). 
The Russian plans collapsed due to the revolutionary events of 191 . Furthermore, 
centrifugal tendencies of war, revolution, and the peace imposed by Germany, resulted in 
the constituent nations of the empire seceding. After the revolution in February 191 , the 
Ukrainian National Council in Kyiv started to work on the creation of an autonomous 
district which would stay in a new, federal Russia.  ater, after the Bolshevik coup, the 
autonomous People’s Republic of Ukraine declared its independence on January 2 , 
191 , and signed a separate peace with Germany and Austria–Hungary. Russia, for its 
part, had to accept the independence of Ukraine according to the Treaty of Brest- itovsk. 
Even so, Ukraine was eventually incorporated into the USSR in 1922. In Brest- itovsk, 
however, some aspirations were already present to the effect of incorporating the 
Podkarpatska Rus to Ukraine, as it shared a border with the People s Republic of Western 
Ukraine. This state was established on November 9, 191 , within Austria-Hungary, and 
aimed to unite the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovyna (two Republics  oined in one state 
on January 22, 1919.) It was  uite logical within this framework to incorporate the Rusyns 
from the other side of the Carpathians into their state (Subtelny , 1992: 29 - 00).  
Toma  Garrigue Masaryk, the future president of Czechoslovakia, showed very few 
– if any – interest in the region. He was convinced that it will eventually be ceded to 
Russia. However, when Russia collapsed due to the revolution, he changed his mind. In 
191 , he spent time in Kyiv, and recorded in his memoirs that he found during his trip 
that the leaders of the Ukrainian movement had nothing against the incorporation of the 
Rusyn lands into Czechoslovakia (Masaryk, 200 : 210). His then-formed intentions only 
took the shape of an formal diplomatic initiative by 191 , during his visit to the United 
States. 
Back in Hungary, Rusyns of Hungarian background were not seriously interested 
in political  uestions, and had no common plans for their future up till the Aster revolution 
(October  1, 191 ). The possibility of national self-determination then appeared on the 
international agenda. Differences among Rusyins arose over the preferences of the 
different regional groups of Rusyns. The  emkos, located in the Western edge of today’s 
Transcarpathian region, and on the Eastern edge of today’s Slovakia, were adherents of 
the pro-Russian claims. They were represented by a Council based in today’s Pre ov 
(Eper es, while in Hungary  part of Slovakia today). The Hutsuls of Máraramos, who 
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were in touch with the Rusyns of Eastern Galicia, were sympathizing in their political 
beliefs with the radical Ukrainian doctrine. The third group, the Boykos were mostly 
apolitical, and had no interest in the political machinations of that time. But the Greek 
Catholic clergy, the ma or site of the spiritual life of the community, as well as their small 
intelligentsia, had a more distinctive orientation towards the traditional Hungarian state. 
Their organization was based in Uzhhorod (Hanak 199 , 9-10).  
Due to the limits of the present study, the actions of the Rusyn organizations in 
Hungary will not be examined. However, we have to state that once the territory of 
today’s Slovakia was taken over by the Czechoslovak forces in December 191 , the 
previously pro-Russian council of Pre ov changed its orientation towards Prague. Similar 
shifts took place in the council of Uzhhorod in Janurary 1919, after the city was occupied 
by the Czechoslovak army. 
Meanwhile, in Paris, on January 1 , 1919, the Paris Peace Conference was 
inaugurated. Czechoslovak diplomacy gained significant successes in the international 
arena. By that time, it was clear that the Rusyn  uestion would be closed by the 
annexation of the territory by Czechoslovakia. Neighboring Romania and Poland, in spite 
of their interest in certain parts of the region, could not really thwart the Czechoslovak 
intentions. Poland declared that it did not claim any territories to the south from the 
Carpathians except some minor areas near today’s Stara  ubovna. Romania was still 
hoping that Subcarpathia would be taken by Russia, which would in turn give it control 
of the territories up to the River Tisza, according to the agreement of 191  cited above. 
Diplomats from Kyiv and Stanislav (i.e., representatives of the People’s Republic of 
Ukraine and the People’s Republic of Western Ukraine) and their claims were not taken 
seriously. Ukraine as a state was considered unviable. Hungary was a defeated country, 
and thus the Hungarian claims were not taken into consideration, either. The Russian 
scenario was likewise implausible as uncertainties regarding the outcome of the civil war 
and the re ection of the Bolshevik regime led the Entente to rule out giving the Rusyn 
territories to Russia (Magocsi, 199 :  2). This made it clear that the Rusyn lands would 
be ceded to Czechoslovakia, as the Czechoslovak diplomats could prove their claims were 
supported by the Rusyn organizations in Hungary as well as in the United States. As 
mentioned above, certain Rusyn councils actually changed their ideas mid-stream, only 
thus, eventually, orientating towards Czechoslovakia. The pioneers of support for the 
Czechoslovak option were the Rusyn emigrant communities in the U.S. who had some 
indirect political influence. 
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The Rusyn immigrant community in the U.S. was not well-organized politically, 
and had no uniform views regarding the future of their homeland. Among a certain group 
of those Rusyn leaders, the first idea to emerge was a certain union with Russia 
(conforming to the plans of Russia aiming at the incorporation of Galicia, which would 
have created a shared border with Rusyns to the south from the Carpathians). Despite this, 
they ultimately played an essential role in the process of the incorporation of today’s 
Transcarpathia into Czechoslovakia.  
In 191 , P otr Hatalak (1   –19 9), a pro-Russian activist of Galician origin, 
sought to assemble a Russian  congress of the representatives of Galicia, Bukovyna and 
the Hungarian Rus  (represented by Nicholas Pachuta). This congress sent a 
memorandum to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly which declared that the Rusyns 
are willing to  oin democratic Russia with all of their ethnic territories (Hatalák, 19  : 
12-1 ). 
Representatives of the Greek Catholic Church, which gathered the ma ority of 
Rusyns living in the U.S., were opposing the statements of the Russian congress and 
declared that Rusyn citizens of Hungary after the end of the war should remain within the 
confines of the Hungarian state, with broad autonomies provided (Pop, 200 : 2  ). The 
Bolshevik coup then undermined the pro-Russian wing of the U.S.-based Rusyns 
diaspora. 
As the circumstances changed, Pachuta decided to build contacts with the American 
Slovak  eague instead. The  eague was engaged in negotiations with Czech 
organizations regarding the union of Czechs and Slovaks in one state, within which 
Slovakia would gain autonomy (Rychl k – Rychl ková, 201 : 19.).  
In May 191 , T. G. Masaryk arrived in the United States. Thanks to his wife, 
Charlotte Garrigue, he already had good relations with the U.S. government, especially 
with Secretary of State Robert  ansing, and thus to the White House. President Woodrow 
Wilson and Masaryk agreed on many things regarding the post-war world settlement, but 
while Wilson aimed to reform Austria–Hungary, Masaryk wished to liberate the Czechs 
and Slovaks from under its rule. The success of Masaryk in the U.S. had been augmented 
by Adolf Joachim Sabath, a U.S. congressman with Czech (or possibly Slovak) ethnic 
 
  In Hungary, the Rusyns were called “orosz” (Russian), besides “ruszin” (Rusyn) and “rutén” (Ruthene). 
“Orosz” comes in this context from Russki  Rusyn (“Russian”, i.e. inhabitant of the Rus), and not 
necessarily from Rossi ski  (Russian, i.e. a citizen of, or one who belongs to, Russia). 
  This term was often used at the beginning of the 20th century. Even in the Czech documents one can find 
references to  Uherská Rus”. 
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roots. Sabath discussed the  uestion of the liberation of the Czech lands in the U.S. 
Congress on May  , 191 . Back then, the dissolution of Austria–Hungary was not even 
part of the discourse among the Entente powers. Furthermore, on several occasions, he 
had  oined Wilson’s entourage on trips abroad, during which he informed the president 
about the actions of Masaryk and pressed the U.S. administration not to conclude a 
separate peace with the Austrian–Hungarian Monarchy (Ho ec, 1999:  - ). 
The previously mentioned Czech–Slovak negotiations led to the signing of the 
Pittsburgh Agreement  on May  0, 191 . Masaryk himself visited the official event. 
Pachuta was in Pittsburgh as well, so he met Masaryk and handed over a memorandum 
issued by the  arodna   rana (National Self-defense, a previously pro-Russian Rusyn 
organization in the U.S.), which declared the union of the entire Carpatho-Russian 
(Rusyn) nation with the Czechoslovak state on the basis of self-governance (A TGM – 
R. PR, K 00, S1). This memorandum had been previously sent to Robert  ansing in April 
1919 (Magocsi, 199 :   ). 
On July 2 , 191 , the Rusyn ecclesial and secular organizations were united in the 
“American National Council of Uhro-Rusinians” (ANRUR). The Council announced the 
possible solutions of the Rusyn  uestion: autonomy within Hungary, to be preferred  if 
that would not be possible:  oin the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina  if that would 
prove similarly impossible,  oin another state, but on the basis of autonomy and the 
protection of their national entity (Pop, 200 : 2  -2  ). In September 191 , the leader of 
the ANRUR became a young lawyer, Gregory Zhatkovych, who was entrusted to work 
on a memorandum which had to be presented to President Wilson, to negotiate on the 
basis of this. Zhatkovych presented the memorandum on October 21, 191 , with the 
above-mentioned position outlined in it. 
During the audience, Wilson explained that the first two options were barely 
plausible, as they would not be supported by the Entente. He suggested to seek autonomy 
within another state (Zhatkovych, 1921:  ). In this matter, Zhatkovych should therefore 
consult with Masaryk, who will participate at a conference in Philadelphia on October 
2 . Zhatkovych then contacted Masaryk and informed him about his meeting with the 
president and registered to participate at the conference of Central European nations in 
Philadelphia (Ho ec, 1999: -9).  
 
  The Pittsburgh Agreement was a memorandum of understanding completed on May  1, 191 , between 
members of the Czech and Slovak expatriate communities in the United States of America. The agreement 
prescribed the intent of the co-signatories to create an independent Czechoslovakia. 
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Masaryk met Zhatkovych and the other five members of ANRUR on October 2 . 
The main topic was the federative union of the Rusyns with Czechoslovakia. When 
representatives of the ANRUR asked Masaryk’s opinion regarding the case, he stated:  If 
the Rusyns decide to  oin the Czechoslovak Republic, they will have a fully autonomous 
state”. Zhatkovych also asked about the boundaries of the Rusyn lands, especially the one 
that would divide them from the Slovaks. Masaryk answered thus:  The borders will be 
designated in such a way that the Rusyns be satisfied” (Zhatkovych, 1921:  - )  
Zhatkovych reported to the ANRUR regarding his negotiations with Wilson and 
Masaryk on the 29th of October. He, however, did not support the union with 
Czechoslovakia in public  Mago  i           . The final decision was adopted on 
November 12, 191  in Scranton,  at the assembly of ANRUR. A copy of the Scranton 
resolution was sent to Masaryk the next day. He showed his appreciation, but also warned 
Zhatkovych that it is only a declaration of a certain council, and that the peace conference 
might also point this out later on. So they started to discuss a plebiscite as an option, 
which later took place in the U.S., organized by Zhatkovych (Zhatkovych, 1921:  ).  
The plebiscite took place in December 191 . According to the results, as many as 
    voted for the union with Czechoslovakia. The results of the plebiscite were sent to 
the Czechoslovak government and the U.S. Department of State (Danko, 2000: 1 2). 
 
 ollo  u  in  aris an     oro  
Thus, by the end of 191 , Masaryk obtained the support of the Rusyn emigration, 
supported by numerous memoranda and a plebiscite. However, in order to avoid any 
accusations that the Rusyn land is to be ceded to the Czechoslovak state only on the basis 
of the leanings of overseas emigrant communities, it was important to convince the local 
Rusyn councils about the advantages of  oining Czechoslovakia. Even though the council 
of Pre ov and some leaders of other regional councils had already declared their 
willingness to unite with Czechoslovakia, there were no  oint statements nor any common 
opinions on their side. This was an outstanding issue to be settled before proceeding. The 
Czechoslovak delegation in Paris included both Rusyn delegates from the USA and 
Rusyns from Hungary. On February 1 , 1919, Zhatkovych arrived in Paris armed with 
the Scranton Resolution and the results of the plebiscite. In Paris, they met with Anton 
 
  Scranton is the sixth largest city of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Rusyn immigration of the late-
19th century largely targeted coal-mining regions, especially the southern part of New  ork State, Western 
Pennsylvania (around Pittsburgh), and mostly northeast Pennsylvania int he vicinity of Scranton. 
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Beskid, head of the council of Pre ov, and together they set out to work as a board. They 
decided to add the memorandums issued by those Rusyn councils which were willing to 
 oin Czechoslovakia (Zhatkovych, 1921:  ). This package of documents was delivered to 
the conference together with the Czechoslovak aide-memoires on the 10th and 11th of 
March. The Rusyn  uestion was described in “Memoire  ”, assessing the situation as 
follows: 
   Rusyns of Hungary are a nation that is very close to the Slovaks, they live 
together in a tight bond and among similar circumstances. Based on this fact, 
the union with the Czechoslovak Republic would not be problematic. 
   This decision fits closest to the existing political realities and would be the most 
legitimate among those involved. This is the direction that Rusyns of the 
Hungarian state should likewise follow. 
   Some of the Rusyns of Hungary already decided to  oin Czechoslovakia 
(ANM, Memoire  : 9). 
By the intervention of Edvard Bene , Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Czechoslovakia, the Rusyn board received an audience from the U.S. delegation and later 
with the head of the Council of Ten, on the 1 th and the 2 th of February, respectively. 
Zhatkovych suggested the Czechoslovak–Rusyn federation as the best solution of the 
Rusyn  uestion and handed over the copies of the documents that contained all the 
necessary information (ANM, Memoire  : 9). The offers of Zhatkovych’s team were 
presented to the Council of Five, which took a positive decision regarding them. The 
Rusyn delegation was informed of the outcome on March  . The following day, the 
American part of the Rusyn delegation left Paris and headed to Prague, to negotiate with 
Masaryk. Then they travelled to Subcarpathia. The main goal was to convince the 
councils to come up with a united conception regarding the future of the region, aiming 
at union with Czechoslovakia. Finally, these councils merged in a single body in 
Uzhhorod, named the Central National Council of Rusyns, on May  , 1919 – this body 
declared that the Rusyns were willing to  oin Czechoslovakia. Alongside this resolution, 
a so-called “1  Points” were issued by the Council. They contained the expectations of 
the Rusyns regarding the organization of their state within Czechoslovakia and their 
territorial claims so that no Rusyn community shall live as a minority in other states. By 
this stage, the Czechoslovak delegation thus gained the declarations of support from the 
Rusyns both in emigration and in Hungary. Once the will of the Rusyns was declared, the 
summer months were dedicated to further negotiations regarding the borders of the – 
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politically – new-born region. Among the territorial  uestions, the ma or issues were the 
fate of Sighetu Marma iei (Máramarosziget), then already under Romanian rule, but 
coveted by the Rusyns themselves, and the annexation of the so-called  emko land in 
Eastern Galicia, which by that time was taken over by the Polish forces, and finally, the 
border that was to separate the lands of Slovaks and Rusyns (AKPR, Podkarpatska Rus I, 
III 1  inv.    9). 
These problematic issues were destined to be left unresolved. As for the proposed 
boundaries of the Rusyn region to be incorporated into Czechoslovakia, a significant 
Hungarian minority was resident in those areas, while a significant Rusyn minority 
outside of it – approximately 100,000 in Romania, and 200,000 in Slovakia and parts of 
Poland. Even though the Rusyn delegation in Paris as well as the Rusyn national councils 
of the region and the overseas communities invested enormous effort in the negotiations 
with the Czechoslovak delegation (and later with Czechoslovak government) to ac uire 
these territories, they never succeeded in reaching that goal. Czechoslovakia never fought 
to gain territories for a Rusyn part of the country as it did for territories to be added to the 
Czech and Slovak constituent parts of that new-born republic. In Podkarpatska Rus, there 
was a low-intensity conflict over the territorial  uestions – with the Kingdom of Romania. 
This one, however, focused on railway connections and other economic issues, rather than 
on territories or boundaries  er  e. 
As was demonstrated, according to the above, in the particular case of Subcarpathia, 
later the Podkarpatska Rus, the principles of self-determination were fulfilled only 
partially. On the one hand, the territory of Podkarpatska Rus was annexed to 
Czechoslovakia based on a plebiscite among the Rusyn emigrants in the USA and on the 
declaration of the  oint Rusyn Council in Uzhhorod. On the other hand, considerations of 
geopolitical interest and high politics also play a ma or role in the events. 
Jules Cambon, head of the territorial committee responsible for the Czechoslovak 
 uestion, was working to achieve the best conditions for France. The goal was to provide 
as many strategically important territories to Poland and Czechoslovakia as possible, so 
they become part of an efficient buffer that can counterbalance Germany as well as 
Soviet-Russia ruled by the Bolsheviks (Magocsi, 199 :   ). Cambon also pointed out the 
importance of encircling and isolating the Kingdom of Hungary. In this matter, the future 
Podkarpatska Rus was critical, as it provided for a strategic link between Czechoslovakia 
and Romania (Pop, 200 : 29 ). 
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From the perspective of Czechoslovakia itself, the Rusyn issue was rather an 
opportunity than a political goal. Czech leaders had been considering to gain certain 
predominantly Rusyn territories from the outset, but incorporating the entire region was 
never really in their minds. Proceeding along these lines had certain advantages. Future 
Czechoslovakia planned to build tight economic relations with Russia. In case Russia 
gained Galicia, Rusyn territories would provide the necessary connection with the eastern 
neighbor, thus facilitating trade (Magocsi, 199 :   ). If Russia’s plans were to come to 
naught, the region would still provide for a connection with Romania. Tellingly, Ji i Cisa , 
Masaryk’s secretary at the time, assessed the Rusyn issue as follows: 
 They  the Rusyns  are very important for us: at the conference in Philadelphia the 
emigrants from the Hungarian Rus represented by Zhatkovych decided to unite their 
territory with Czechoslovakia. They were ready to state it even at the peace 
conference. Due to this, they are allowed to achieve self-government for their nation 
while we gain the critically important connection with Romania.” ( uoted in Vanat, 
19 9:   .) 
 
Con lusion 
So why did the Rusyns  oin Czechoslovakia  As outlined in this article, viewed under the 
political circumstances prevailing at the time, Czechoslovakia seemed to be the most 
reasonable choice: a newborn state formed of Slavic nations of the former Austro–
Hungarian Empire, pledging to operate on the basis of the principles of democracy and 
self-government for its constituent parts.  eading members of the Rusyn emigration were 
content with such a scenario based on the negotiations and the agreements reached. 
The intricacies of the regional situation went far beyond the  uestion of self-
determination, or the will of a nation which had never before had a nation-state or a 
strictly defined political doctrine as such. The Paris Peace Conference and the leaders of 
the Czechoslovak movement had, however, another interest at stake: in shaping their new 
state, they had to keep in mind the strategic and economic considerations of the leading 
powers of the Conference, such as the need to establish a territorial connection with 
Romania, for example. Many times the principles of national self-determination were 
used, unfortunately, to  ustify the military and economic plans of the ma or powers, 
securing their interests. Nevertheless, as a result of the Peace Conference, the ma ority of 
Rusyns were united in the framework of a single territorial unit, named Podkarpatska Rus, 
as part of the Republic of Czechoslovakia. In the new state, Rusyns were not considered 
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a minority   they had their official language, press, education, as well as their own 
political parties and movements. 
As may be concluded, it is not easy to please all parties and interests without 
harming anyone even if the stakeholders are on the same side. This was one of the lessons 
which the Rusyns learned at the peace conference that concluded World War I one-
hundred years ago. 
The story of the Rusyn lands is an often overlooked case in the context of the 
territorial re-ordering of Europe that took place after World War I. However, its 
significance goes beyond the direct repercussions for the Rusyns. The outcome raises 
important  uestions as to the principle of self-determination: What exactly constitutes a 
nation that has the right to lay claim to a national territory  What are the prere uisites to 
be recognized as a nation in the international field  And, most of all, what are the limits 
of self-determination  
The case also underlines the fact that the post-war territorial re-ordering of Europe 
did not merely ad ust international boundaries to the existing political realities but at times 
the Conference itself created new political realities based on the redefinition of state 
structures and the very concepts of nation and territory. 
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